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In the Groundwork Kant asserts that the fundamental moral principle must 
be a principle of autonomy. He dismisses theistic principles, along with all 
other competitors to his Categorical Imperative, claiming that they are heter-
onomous. I argue that the best case for this Kantian conclusion conflates 
our access to the reasons for our commitments with an ability to state these 
reasons such that they could figure in an argument. This conflation, in turn, 
results from a certain Kantian conception of inclination, and its role in our 
moral psychology. These are views that we ought to reject. Having done so, 
we will see that a theistic ethics based on desire or love for God need not face 
a distinctive problem of heteronomy.
Kant claims that a principle of action that makes reference to God could 
not be the fundamental moral principle. In both the Groundwork of the Meta-
physics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason he dismisses theistic 
principles, along with all other competitors to his Categorical Imperative. 
He claims that they are principles of heteronomy, while the fundamental 
moral principle must be a principle of autonomy.1 Most contemporary 
Kantians, and many other contemporary thinkers as well, agree that an 
approach to ethics founded on theistic commitments would face some dis-
tinctive problem of heteronomy. But the nature of this purported problem 
is less than transparent, and Kant’s own reasons for rejecting ethical views 
that are theistic in this sense are not what one might have thought. I will 
argue that, in fact, Kant’s rejection of a theistic moral principle in these 
texts has surprisingly little to do with theism, but instead turns on some 
of his more general commitments about moral psychology, commitments 
that we ought to reject.
After briefly clarifying Kant’s stance towards theistic ethics in the first 
section, in the second I examine his argument for the uniqueness of the 
Categorical Imperative (CI). Kant claims that the CI is the only possible 
1Immanuel Kant, Groundwork, 4:441–445; Critique of Practical Reason, 5:82–86.
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fundamental moral principle. To establish this, he argues that it is the only 
principle that could be fully justified, and so the only one the authority of 
which could be accepted non-dogmatically, and thus autonomously. But 
this argument relies on what I will call a hyper-rationalist conception of 
autonomy, on which you can endorse a practical principle autonomously 
only if you can reason to it and so answer all intelligible skeptical chal-
lenges that could be brought against it.
The appeal of the hyper-rationalist standard in turn depends on con-
flating our access to the reasons for our commitments with an ability to state 
these reasons, to capture them in propositional form. If we treat access as re-
quiring this sort of articulacy, then the only alternative to hyper-rationalism 
would be accepting practical convictions without reason, that is, dogmat-
ically. To locate a middle ground between these two extremes, we need a 
way of actively appreciating or grasping reasons that does not require us 
to be articulate about these reasons, capable of reporting what they are. 
In section III I argue that a certain conception of desire—and more par-
ticularly love—is well suited to play this role, and so that a theistic ethics 
grounded in the love of God could occupy the middle ground, avoiding 
dogmatism without putting its adherent in a position to defend all of her 
commitments in terms that would move a skeptic.
In section IV I explain how Kant’s own conception of the nature of de-
sire and its role in our moral psychology obscures this possibility. Kant’s 
Groundwork argument for the uniqueness of the CI depends on a partic-
ularly stark dualism concerning sensible and rational motives. On this 
dualistic view, we are subject to two distinct sorts of motives or incentives 
to action: inclinations that precede reasoning and a unique rational motive 
that follows from reasoning. But, on independent grounds, we ought to 
reject the idea that these two categories of motivation exhaust the possi-
bilities. Having done so we can see that a theistic ethic based on desire or 
love for God need not face a distinctive problem of heteronomy.
I. Kant on the Unique Status of the Categorical Imperative
When Kant dismisses theistic principles as candidates for the funda-
mental moral law, he gives them plenty of good company. He claims that 
theistic principles have the same failing as all prior attempts to state the 
fundamental moral principle: They are principles of heteronomy, while 
the moral principle must be a principle of autonomy. Here is how he puts 
it in the Groundwork:
If we look back upon all previous efforts that have ever been made to dis-
cover the principle of morality, we need not wonder now why all of them 
had to fail. It was seen that the human being is bound to law by his duty, but 
it never occurred to them that he is subject only to laws given by himself but still 
universal. . . . For, if one thought of him only as subject to a law (whatever it 
may be), this law had to carry with it some interest by way of attraction or 
constraint, since it did not as a law arise from his will; in order to conform 
with the law, his will had instead to be constrained by something else to act in 
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a certain way. By this quite necessary consequence, however, all the labor to 
find a supreme ground of duty was irretrievably lost. For, one never arrived 
at duty but instead at the necessity of an action from a certain interest. . . . 
But then the imperative had to turn out always conditional and could not be 
fit for a moral command. I will therefore call [the categorical imperative] the 
principle of the autonomy of the will in contrast with every other, which I 
accordingly count as heteronomy.2
Any interpreter of Kant’s argument faces the challenge of how to under-
stand his ideal of autonomy, and the contrasting threat of heteronomy, in a 
way that can make sense of the claim that the CI—“act only in accordance 
with that maxim through which you could at the same time will that it 
become a universal law”3—is the only possible principle of autonomy.
Before turning to this question directly, it bears notice that Kant’s claims 
about the unique status of the CI are in one way weaker and in another 
way stronger than one might initially think. His position is weaker than 
we might think in that he rejects theistic and other principles only as 
candidates for the fundamental moral law, or what he here calls “the prin-
ciple of morality.” That is, he claims that, like all other possible practical 
principles, if principles that make essential reference to God assert gen-
uine obligations, they do so only in virtue of their relation to the CI. If 
they have authority, this authority is derivative from that fundamental 
principle.4 Importantly, his argument here does not depend on denying 
the antecedent of the conditional, and so does not purport to rule out the 
possibility that the theistic principles are authoritative.
Compare this to the practical principle: Advance the happiness of others. 
Taken in a maximizing way this is the utilitarian’s candidate for the funda-
mental moral law. But Kant thinks that this principle, like others, could not 
have that fundamental status. Even so, he ultimately affirms the authority 
of this principle, though in a non-maximizing version. That is, he thinks 
that we really do have reasons—categorical moral reasons no less—to ad-
vance the happiness of others.5 He claims only that these reasons can’t 
be fundamental. They are, instead, derivative from the CI; their authority 
depends on, or is justified by appeal to, its authority.
2Kant, Groundwork, 4:432–433.
3Kant, Groundwork, 4:419. This is the formulation of the Categorical Imperative usually 
called the Formula of Universal Law (FUL). Compare the Formula of Autonomy (FA): “Do 
no action on any other maxim than one such that it would be consistent with it to be a 
universal law, and hence to act only so that the will could regard itself as at the same time giving 
universal law through its maxim” (4:434). In my view, FA is not different in content from FUL, 
the statement of which I find somewhat more perspicuous. But Allen Wood lays great em-
phasis on the claim that FA is the definitive statement of the CI and rejects the idea that the 
statements are equivalent (Wood, Kantian Ethics).
4Elsewhere Kant makes the stronger claim that we could not have duties to God, but 
his reasons for this are independent of the argument under consideration here. They are 
grounded in his epistemic commitments and require independent assessment. See Kant, 
Metaphysics, 6:443–444. For more detail, see n33.
5Or, as I prefer to say, reasons to make their ends our own. See Ebels-Duggan, “Against 
Beneficence.” For Kant’s argument see Metaphysics of Morals, 6:387–389. 
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For all Kant says in the argument we are considering, a theistic principle 
might have the same status. And, in fact, his rejection of a theistic fun-
damental moral principle notwithstanding, Kant’s practical philosophy 
incorporates theistic commitments. He claims that, while morality does 
not depend on religion, it “leads to” religion. That is, he thinks that one 
can argue from moral commitments established on independent grounds 
to the rational necessity of what he calls “moral faith” in God.6 Kant also 
claims that, though the fundamental moral principle is not a theistic prin-
ciple, we must nevertheless “recognize” or “regard” our duties as God’s 
commands.7 The details of these arguments, and the meaning of their 
conclusions, need not concern us here. But their presence in Kant’s system 
clearly indicates that Kant does not deny the authority of all theistic prac-
tical principles, and in fact holds that a complete moral philosophy has to 
make reference to God. Even so, he consistently maintains that no theistic 
principle could be the fundamental moral principle on account of the fact 
that all such principles are heteronomous.
His claim about the uniqueness of the CI is also stronger than one might 
think, in that it asserts, not only that competitors are not the fundamental 
moral principle, but that they could not be. They are not even candidates 
for this role. Kant thinks that theistic principles not only have the wrong 
content to be fundamental moral principles, but that they are the wrong 
sort of principles. They have the wrong form. That is why, as he puts it, all 
of the previous attempts to identify the fundamental moral principle not 
only failed, but “had to fail.”8
To make a start on understanding Kant’s claim about form, consider the 
proposal that the fundamental moral principle is the following: Human 
beings are inherently selfish. Kant will reject this proposal, of course, and 
moreover his rejection will not depend on an assessment of the truth of 
what the claim asserts. If we agree with him that practical principles must 
be imperatives, then we will likewise reject it. Whether we think that this 
6Exactly how we should understand this argument is a matter of interpretive dispute. For 
my own account, see Ebels-Duggan, “The Right, the Good, and the Threat of Despair.” For 
some competing accounts see Hare, The Moral Gap; Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion; Neiman, The 
Unity of Reason; Sussman, “Something to Love.” For discussion of Kant’s distinction between 
“theological morality,” which he rejects, and “moral theology,” which he endorses, see Kain, 
“Interpreting Kant’s Theory of Divine Commands.”
7Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:129. Cf Religion, 6:99. Notably, Religion 6:160 asserts 
that acting from love of God just is acting from the distinctively moral motive of duty: “Do 
your duty from no other incentive except the unmediated appreciation of duty itself, i.e. 
love God (the Legislator of all duties) above all else.” I think that most readers, whether or 
not they are sympathetic to the case that we can act autonomously from love, will resist this 
identification, and such resistance is warranted. Among other considerations, Kant clearly 
understands the moral motive as a motive to which we can reason, one that “follows on” 
rather than “preceding” practical reasoning. But no line of reasoning could conclude with an 
attitude that we would recognize as love. While we can reason to the judgment that someone 
is lovable or that there is good reason to love her, these judgments are not the same as love 
itself. I return to this thought below, in section III. For more see Ebels-Duggan, “Love and 
Agency.”
8Kant, Groundwork, 4:432.
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claim about human beings is true or false does not matter here. The claim 
is not the right sort of thing to serve as a fundamental moral principle. It’s 
not a candidate. It has the wrong form.
Considering the larger context of the argument of the Groundwork can 
help us grasp the point. There Kant offers an argument for the authority of 
the CI in two steps. In the first he asks, If there were a moral law, what would 
it have to be? He states and defends the CI as an answer to this conditional 
question, and he argues that we can derive the content of this unique can-
didate moral principle from the formal requirements on the very idea of 
a moral principle. Only then does he turn to the second question, whether 
there really is a moral law, construing this as whether the CI—the only pos-
sible candidate—genuinely has authority.9 Importantly, Kant dismisses 
theistic principles in the first of these two steps. So, he thinks that we can 
reject theistic principles without so much as considering their particular 
content, because they have the wrong form. This puzzling statement is an 
important clue to how Kant understands the ideal of autonomy, one that 
we must keep in mind as we proceed.
So far, I have explained how Kant’s claim that the CI is the sole prin-
ciple of autonomy is in one way weaker and in one way stronger than one 
might think. It is weaker in that it does not rule out the authority of other 
practical principles, but claims only that any such authority would have to 
derive from that of the CI. And it is stronger in that it claims that theistic 
principles are not possible principles of autonomy; they are not candidates 
for the fundamental moral law. We will not be in a position to evaluate, 
or even fully understand, these Kantian claims until we have an account 
of his conception of “autonomy” and “heteronomy.” I turn to this task in 
the next section.
II. Kantian Autonomy: From the Rejection of Dogmatism to Hyper-Rationalism
In the Groundwork passage quoted above, Kant introduces the claim that 
the moral principle must be a principle of autonomy. He also asserts that all 
possible principles of action are either principles of autonomy, arising from 
one’s own will, or principles of heteronomy, grounded in some interest. 
We need an understanding of both sides of this purportedly exhaustive 
division. In this section, I focus on first. My strategy will be to ask how 
Kant’s argument for the claim that the CI is the only possible principle 
of autonomy is supposed to work, and then to use this to illuminate the 
conception of autonomy to which it must refer. I will lay out a reading that 
takes the form of a regress on rational conditions. The argument purports 
9Cf. Korsgaard’s introduction to Kant’s Groundwork. The argumentative structure of the 
second Critique is somewhat different, but not in a way that matters for our purposes. There 
also Kant begins by arguing that the mere concept of a moral law determines that the moral 
law must be a principle of autonomy, and the CI is the only possible principle of autonomy. 
What differs is that he no longer seems to think that he needs to provide an argument that 
establishes the authority of the CI by showing how it can motivate us. Instead he treats it as 
a “fact of reason” that we can be motivated by our recognition of its authority.
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to show that our reasons for regarding any practical principle as authori-
tative would have to derive from the authority of the CI, while the CI itself 
is, in a significant sense, self-authenticating.10
We may begin this argument by considering any practical principle that 
someone might accept as authoritative. For example, we might consider 
a person who acts on the following principle: Never do something that is 
inconsistent with your honor, but act always as honor demands.11 This person 
regards acting in a way consistent with his honor as required, something 
that he must do, whether or not he wants to. In the same way, we could 
begin with someone for whom a principle making reference to God plays 
this same role, a person who takes acting as God wills, or commands, or 
for God’s sake to be an authoritative practical principle for her.12
Those who accept and act from some such principle are already au-
tonomous in a minimal sense; such a person directs himself by a practical 
principle that he regards as authoritative, a requirement that he takes it that 
he must follow even at cost to things he wants. It would be apt to say that 
he regards this principle as a law for himself. But Kant thinks that there 
is still a problem of heteronomy in both of these cases, that such a person 
must think of himself “only as subject to a law (whatever it may be).”
One might naturally think that Kant’s objection to the principles under 
consideration would be that they direct their agents to rely on an authority 
external to them. This may seem a particularly apt diagnosis of the theistic 
agent, but we might similarly understand acting on a principle of honor 
as treating society’s conventions as an external authority. However, this 
reliance on authority cannot be the whole story about what troubles Kant 
here, for neither Kant nor contemporary Kantians reject the possibility 
of legitimate authority. Kant’s political philosophy not only allows, but 
requires this possibility.13 So, when he dismisses theistic ethics as heteron-
omous, he must have something more particular in mind.
Suppose our agents began to doubt or question the authority of their 
principles. They could settle these questions if they understood and af-
firmed the reasons that ground the principles, where these could include 
reasons to accept and defer to certain external sources of authority. For 
instance, in his political philosophy Kant seeks to give an argument for 
the legitimate authority of the institutions of the state.14 Assuming that his 
10Cf. Korsgaard’s introduction to Kant’s Groundwork, and also “Kant’s Analysis of Obliga-
tion.” Other important passages from Kant include: Groundwork, 4:399–402, the conclusion 
of the argument of Groundwork I, which ends with the first statement of the CI; 4:420–422, 
the passage in Groundwork II in which Kant argues that the content of the CI, in its universal 
law formulation, can be derived from the mere concept of the CI; and 4:440, where he claims 
that the CI is the sole principle of autonomy, and commands “neither more nor less than just 
this autonomy.” 
11Cf. “Idea for a Universal History,” 26. 
12Korsgaard uses this example in both texts cited above. 
13Cf. Pallikkathayil, “Deriving Morality from Politics.”
14See, especially, The Doctrine of Right in Metaphysics or Morals. For detailed reconstruction 
of this argument see Ebels-Duggan, “Moral Community.”
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argument is sound, an agent who reasons through it can conclude that 
the government’s authority is legitimate. This would render the principle 
respect the authority of the government self-imposed or autonomous in a fur-
ther, significant sense: It is the agent’s own conclusion, the conclusion of 
her own reasoning.15 Reasoning is something that the agent does, her own 
activity, so that when she reasons to the conclusion that some principle is 
authoritative, it makes sense to say that she gives that principle to herself.16
So here we have a more sophisticated view of autonomy, on which an 
agent counts as acting autonomously just so long as she can reason to 
the principle on which she acts. On this reading, Kant’s concern about 
heteronomy is a concern about justification or the lack thereof. Since a true 
principle of autonomy is susceptible to the sort of justification that would 
allow an agent to reason to it for herself, it is not enough for the prin-
ciple to have some justification. That justification must be accessible to the 
agent who accepts and guides herself by the principle. Only if she can give 
the argument for the principle on which she acts, reasoning through this 
argument for herself, can she accept or maintain her commitment to the 
principle on the basis of this reasoning and so, in the relevant sense, au-
tonomously. By contrast, an agent who depends on an external authority 
absent an understanding of the reasons that support doing so could only 
affirm the standing of this authority dogmatically.
Now, suppose that we ask the agents that we are considering the 
justificatory question about their principles, and so raise the doubts for 
them. We ask the person of honor: Why think that the fact that an action 
is required by your society’s code of honor is sufficient to require you to 
do it? Or we inquire of the theistic agent: Why suppose that you are re-
quired to do as God commands? Faced with such a question, an agent 
who continues to affirm his principle has two apparent choices; he must 
either give reasons for maintaining his commitment or continue to regard 
it as authoritative without such justification.17 The latter option appears 
to render him dogmatic. On the other hand, an agent who gives some 
justification will thereby appeal to a further practical principle that he 
treats as more fundamental than the one he is defending. Whether or not 
the agent answers the justificatory challenge, then, any practical principle 
the authority of which can be intelligibly questioned cannot serve as the 
fundamental moral principle.
15Since Kant identifies the will and practical reason, we could also say that it is the conclu-
sion of her will. Kant, Groundwork, 4:412 and cf. 4:427. 
16Cf. Hieronymi, “Two Kinds of Agency.” See also, Korsgaard, “The Activity of Reason.”
17Kant’s discussion of the possibility of appealing to God as the ground of moral obliga-
tion at Groundwork 4:443 can be read as presenting this dilemma. If we are to obey God, it is 
because of God’s moral perfection or his power. But if it is the former, we must have some 
account of moral perfection that justifies this attribution, and that account then provides our 
more fundamental moral commitment. The latter is the wrong sort of thing to ground the 
moral law. It could only be affirmed dogmatically.
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Moreover, to escape a regress of further intelligible questioning, such 
an argument cannot depend on any premises that are themselves open 
to question. It must rely only on commitments about which no mean-
ingful skeptical questions can arise.18 So, on this strong conception, the 
fully autonomous person is capable of answering all meaningful skeptical 
questions about her commitments, and of doing so in a way that appeals 
only to premises that the skeptic accepts, arguments that should move a 
skeptic from his own point of view. I will call this very strong conception 
of autonomy hyper-rationalism.
At this point one might wonder what principle could possibly escape 
the dilemma above. In developing her constructivist interpretation of 
Kant’s Groundwork argument, Christine Korsgaard raises this question 
and provides an answer. She writes:
Kant concludes that the will must be autonomous: that is, it must have its 
own law or principle. And here again we arrive at the problem. For where is 
this law to come from? If it is imposed on the will from outside then the will 
is not free. So the will must make the law for itself. But until the will has a 
law or principle, there is nothing from which it can derive a reason. So how 
can it have any reason for making one law rather than another?
 Well, here is the Kantian answer. The categorical imperative, as repre-
sented by the Formula of Universal Law, tells us to act only on a maxim 
which we could will to be a law. And this, according to Kant, is the law of a 
free [or autonomous] will.19
The Kantian constructivist purports to avoid dogmatic acceptance of 
her fundamental principle by demonstrating that affirmation of its au-
thority is already contained in the question about whether it has authority. 
On Korsgaard’s interpretation, to ask of any candidate practical principle 
whether it really is authoritative is to ask whether it is properly regarded 
as a law. Applied to any other principle, this question demands an answer 
and so generates the dilemma above. That’s the feature that Kant picks 
out when he says that all of these other principles are of the wrong form 
to serve as the fundamental moral principle. But if you try to query the 
CI in this same way, you are simply asking the question that the CI itself 
directs you to ask, namely, is the principle on which I am acting fit to be 
regarded as a law? That is to say, raising the justificatory challenge is itself 
an application of the principle, and so it amounts to affirming the CI. This, 
18Compare Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 33 (cf. 12, 38–39):
Realism is a metaphysical position in the exact sense criticized by Kant. We can 
keep asking why: “Why must I do what is right?”—”Because it is commanded 
by God.”—”But why must I do what is commanded by God?”—and so on, in a 
way that can apparently go on forever. This is what Kant called a search for the 
unconditioned—in this case, for something which will bring the reiteration of “but 
why must I do that?” to an end. The unconditional answer must be one that makes 
it impossible, unnecessary, or incoherent to ask why again.
19Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 98.
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then, is where intelligible justificatory queries come to an end, and it is this 
that renders the CI the unique principle of autonomy.20
Many interpreters of Kant believe that we should not saddle him 
with this, admittedly radical, hyper-rationalist conception of autonomy. 
But we have seen an important consideration in favor of doing so: the 
hyper-rationalist conception makes sense of Kant’s, otherwise puzzling, 
very strong claims about the uniqueness of the CI. The same cannot be 
said of some other leading attempts to explicate Kant’s conception of this 
central notion. Consider, for example, Allen Wood’s influential realist 
interpretation of Kant’s argument. Wood holds that autonomy is the “ca-
pacity to govern our own lives according to rational principles,” and that 
we are fully autonomous when we act on objectively justified principles, that 
is, principles that don’t just purport to be, but really are, authoritative 
practical laws.21 On Wood’s view, it is simply because the CI is just such 
an objectively authoritative practical principle that the agent who gov-
erns herself by it is an autonomous agent.22 So calling the CI a principle 
of autonomy is then nothing more than a fancy way of saying that that 
principle is right, one that we ought to follow.
One may then wish to ask Wood the sort of question that we imagined 
addressed to the theist and the person of honor, above: On what grounds 
should we affirm the authority of the CI? What is the objective justification 
to which you refer? Wood responds to this query, rather unhelpfully, by 
quoting Kant’s claim from his Lectures on Ethics that the CI has objective 
authority “in the nature (or essence) of things.”23 In particular he claims 
that the nature of the rational will makes it the case that the CI has this 
authority. The idea that the will is practical reason, and so constituted by 
20This constructivist strategy faces a well-known worry that it renders the CI an empty 
formalism. In order to answer that challenge, the Kantian constructivist needs to show 
something beyond the case already developed: she needs to show that the mere form of law 
constrains the substance of the particular principles of action that can be willed as a law. That 
is, she must show that some substantive principles may, and others must, be regarded as 
laws just in virtue of their formal properties. Kant may be addressing this sort of challenge 
when he runs through a series of examples purporting to demonstrate actual constraints that 
the CI imposes at Groundwork 4:421–424. And cf. Korsgaard, “Kant’s Formula of Universal 
Law.” If this or a similar attempt succeeds, the Kantian constructivist can derive guiding, 
authoritative normative commitments just from the formal demands that would apply to 
any such commitment. She would thereby meet the demanding hyper-rationalist standard. 
She would also make sense of both the idea that we give the moral law to ourselves and the 
idea that this law has objective content, two claims that Kant clearly affirms, but which are, 
on the face of it, in serious tension with one another. Wood denies that these two ideas can be 
reconciled (Wood, Kantian Ethics, 106–122).
21Wood, Kantian Ethics, 106.
22Wood, Kantian Ethics, 116–122. See, especially, 119:
The moral law is not a law of autonomy because we stand in some relation of sov-
ereign authority to the law, as we would if we were the author of merely positive 
or statutory laws. It is the law of autonomy only insofar as we succeed in aligning 
our will with what the law objectively commands, thus actualizing the nature of 
our will as a faculty of practical reason.
23Wood, Kantian Ethics, 114.
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the norms of practical reason, including moral norms, figures in Wood’s 
argument.24 But he does not explain the grounds on which we should 
think that the very principles that Kant endorses, including the CI, are 
these constitutive norms of the will. Elsewhere, he seems to deny that such 
an argument could be given or should be sought.25
Wood’s interpretation cannot capture Kant’s aims or argumentative 
strategy in the Groundwork. For, of course, advocates of the competitor 
principles Kant dismisses also regard their candidate principles as ob-
jective, that is as genuine authoritative practical laws. Kant argues that 
these principles are—at best—derivatively authoritative, because they are 
principles of heteronomy. But Wood’s interpretation would require Kant 
to reverse the order of this argument. Rather than claiming that compet-
itors are not the fundamental principle of practical reason because they 
are not principles of autonomy, Wood would have Kant claiming that 
they are principles of heteronomy because they are not genuine practical 
laws. An appeal to autonomy in Wood’s sense could thus give no grounds 
for ruling out a theistic, or any other, principle. Identifying a principle as 
heteronomous would merely report the fact that we have already, on some 
independent basis, ruled it out. But recall that Kant asserts that the CI is 
the unique principle of autonomy prior to purporting to establish its au-
thority, and he rules out the competitors without attention to their content, 
based solely on their form. Wood’s reading can make no sense of this.
Wood’s conception of autonomy is less demanding than the hyper- 
rationalist standard. But, precisely because of this, it also fails to vindicate 
Kant’s claim that the CI is the unique principle of autonomy, and so the 
unique candidate for a fundamental moral principle. While I have not 
argued that any alternative to the hyper-rationalist reading of autonomy 
will fail in a similar way, all such readings face the challenge of explaining 
Kant’s argument for the uniqueness of the CI. Meeting this challenge is far 
from trivial.
So far, then, we have seen that Kant claims that, while theistic princi-
ples could be authoritative, the CI is the only principle that could possibly 
be the fundamental moral principle. He tells us that this is because the 
CI is the uniquely autonomous principle. And we have gleaned his 
meaning from the argument that he provides for the CI’s unique status: 
it is the only principle about which no intelligible justificatory question 
24Wood, Kantian Ethics, 115–116. As with the (closely related) claim that the CI is the sole 
principle of autonomy, Wood seems to be reasoning to this claim about constitutive norms 
from the claim that the norms in question are objectively valid. So understood, the argument 
obviously does not give us any reason to accept the claim that they are objectively valid. 
25Wood, Kantian Ethics, 89, 93. What Wood is directly opposing in these passages is the 
idea that we could provide a compelling argument for the claim that humanity is objectively 
valuable. This is very closely related to the question about whether the CI is authoritative, or 
a constitutive norm of the will, both because of the way that the value of humanity figures 
in one of Kant’s formulations of the CI, and because Wood himself understands the task of 
identifying an objective end as equivalent to showing how the rational will could be moved 
to act on a categorical imperative.
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can be raised, and so the only one the authority of which we can affirm 
non-dogmatically. This argument construes autonomy as a matter of 
meeting the hyper-rationalist standard; an agent can act autonomously on 
a principle if, but only if, she can give an argument for that principle that 
would answer all intelligible skeptical challenges to it. And only the agent 
who acts from the CI can do that.
III. Middle Ground
The appeal of the hyper-rationalist conception of autonomy depends 
largely on the suggestion that the two alternatives that Kant mentions 
in the Groundwork passage really are exhaustive, so that anything short 
of meeting the hyper-rationalist standard would amount to dogma-
tism. But in this section I suggest a middle path between dogmatism 
and hyper-rationalism and explain why this middle path seems open to 
someone who affirms a theistic fundamental ethical principle.
To resist the pressure to hyper-rationalism, while yet avoiding dog-
matism, we need to understand how it is possible to have access to, 
understand, and affirm the reasons for our commitments, while lacking 
full articulacy about these reasons. Happily, we have some familiar 
models available to us.26 Consider the affirmation that Shakespeare’s plays 
are great works of literature. One way to come to this view is by accepting 
it on someone else’s say-so, perhaps that of one’s apparently authoritative 
high school teacher. While the authority of the teacher may give grounds 
for supposing that there are sufficient reasons to affirm the claim, someone 
who adopts the view based solely on testimony in this way would have no 
insight into the content of these reasons.27 Since it is held without under-
standing of the reasons justifying it, even if a normative attitude formed in 
this way could be warranted, we might reasonably identify it as dogmatic.
Contrast what it is like to read the plays and thereby come to appreciate 
or love them. One might well benefit from the guidance of the teacher in 
this endeavor, but one would no longer be dependent on the authority of 
her report in one’s assessment of the work. Assuming that Shakespeare’s 
works really are great, coming to affirm this through developing an ap-
preciation of them seems paradigmatically autonomous; one experiences 
for oneself the value that one affirms, and one arrives at the normative 
attitude on the basis of that experience. It would be wrong to think of a so-
formed affirmation of Shakespeare’s greatness as dogmatic in any sense.
But one who appreciates, and perhaps even comes to love, Shakespearean 
dramas in this way may yet be unable to say what it is that makes the work 
great. She may be unable to give, that is, to report, the reasons for her 
conviction that this is so. Even if she can say something, she will almost 
certainly fall short of the hyper-rationalist standard; she will not be able to 
answer all intelligible skeptical questions nor put the reasons for her love 
26Here I draw on the argument in Ebels-Duggan, “Beyond Words.”
27Cf. Tenenbaum, Appearances of the Good, on direct and oblique access to value.
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in the form of an argument that would convince a Shakespeare skeptic by 
his own lights.
In fact, something stronger is true. It must be impossible in principle to 
capture fully the reasons for her love in an argument that could be reported 
to third parties. For if a sound argument fully captures the reasons for the 
attitude that it defends, it can convince us of its conclusion and thereby 
bring us to adopt the attitude in question. Think about what it is like to 
reason through a mathematical proof. If you reason through the proof, 
and understand it, you draw the conclusion, and that just is to acquire the 
belief that that conclusion is true. So, if it were possible to state fully the rea-
sons to love Shakespeare’s plays in the form of an argument, then anyone 
who could follow the reasoning laid out in that argument could thereby 
reason to love of the works as a conclusion. That would render reading 
the plays an eliminable step in coming to love them. A teacher who aimed 
to inspire love of Shakespeare in her students wouldn’t need to give them 
the plays to read, but could instead simply tell them what makes the plays 
great. But, in fact, this isn’t possible. Using that method, a teacher could, 
at best, get her students to believe that Shakespeare’s works are great, but 
to believe this is not yet to love them. No line of reasoning can substitute 
for the role that encounter with the texts themselves plays in arriving at 
love. Only someone who has read the works, who has experienced and 
appreciated them for herself, can affirm their worth in the non-dogmatic 
way that students who read, appreciate, and so come to love the plays do. 
Though accepting a positive assessment of Shakespeare’s works based just 
on a report of their good-making features might count as autonomous, 
coming to this assessment in response to the works themselves would be 
more, not less, so.
Love of other persons seems to have this same structure. In loving an-
other, I appreciate directly the value that grounds my commitment, the 
value of the person that I love. This direct appreciation does not yield an 
ability to capture the reasons justifying my love in articulable claims, prop-
ositions that could be presented to a skeptic as a full account of the reasons 
for my love. As with love of a literary work, the reasons grounding inter-
personal love must outrun our ability to report them, even in principle.28 
For, again, if they did not, then someone could come to share your love 
of a person just by reasoning through some argument that you present. 
But this seems to be impossible, not just psychologically but conceptually. 
In order to love a person, you must know her; it is not enough to simply 
know some things about her.29 Though we can have reasons for love, love 
28Cf. Setiya, “Love and the Value of a Life.”
29In the normal case, we encounter those whom we come to love directly in real life. Our 
love arises from appreciation of them that is forged in interactions with them. It may also be 
possible to love a person whom you’ve not met on the basis of sufficiently vivid stories about 
them. If so, then there is a sense in which you could come to love a person on the basis of 
mere report. But a story is not an argument, and this does not show that you could come to 
love a person by reasoning to that love.
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cannot be the conclusion of a line of reasoning in the way that a belief or 
a decision to act can.30
If all of this is right, then commitments constituted by or grounded in 
interpersonal love not only standardly do not, but in principle cannot, 
meet the hyper-rationalist standard. Those who have these commitments 
are unable to articulate compelling reasons for them, yet it would be wrong 
to think of their affirmation of the value of those they love as dogmatic. 
Like the student who appreciates Shakespeare’s plays, the lover bases her 
commitment on her own experience of the value she affirms, and there is 
nothing dogmatic about that.31
It seems to me that many, arguably all, of our important normative 
commitments work in accordance with this model. They are not a matter 
of affirming some normative view dogmatically, as if by mere report, 
with no insight into the reasons for doing so. Nor do they meet the 
hyper-rationalist standard on which we can give a complete defense of 
our view, reasoning to it in a way that ought to move any skeptic. Among 
such commitments are many actual instances of religious commitment, 
and an attractive model of theistic ethics would draw on this, placing love 
of God at its foundation.32 To guide oneself by this ethic would be to live 
out one’s love for God, obeying God’s commands or seeking to emulate 
God’s character or do God’s will as an expression of this love. It would 
be inaccurate to classify normative commitment based on love of God, or 
theistic ethics so conceived, as in principle, or necessarily, dogmatic in the 
same way that it would be wrong to classify the students’ response to their 
appreciation of Shakespeare this way.33
Could such an approach to ethics count as autonomous? Certainly not 
on the hyper-rationalist version of autonomy, on which the autonomous 
person must be able to say what her reasons are. Religious commitment 
would not meet this standard, but neither would my appreciation of 
Shakespeare or my love for my children. I am not able to argue doubters 
into accepting these values either. Rather than casting aspersions on all 
30For more development of the case of love see Ebels-Duggan, “Love and Agency.”
31Cf. Velleman, “Love as a Moral Emotion,” and Gaita, A Common Humanity, especially 
259–285. 
32Cf. Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods. I will not defend this way of thinking about the-
istic ethics against alternatives at any length here, but it seems to me more continuous with 
Christian theological traditions, and probably other monotheistic traditions as well, than 
alternatives that figure more prominently in the philosophical literature.
33Other parts of Kant’s view raise independent objections to at least some theistic ap-
proaches. In the first Critique Kant famously rejects the idea that we can have any knowledge 
concerning God (Bxxx). But see Andrew Chignell, “Belief in Kant.” Even absent Kant’s 
distinctive epistemological views, many readers will worry that we have to have some in-
dependent argument for God’s existence before the position that I am suggesting here is 
available to us. And in the Doctrine of Virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues on 
conceptual grounds that we can have no duties to God. Engaging with these arguments is be-
yond the scope of this paper. The objection to theistic ethics that I address here is just that the 
sort of submission to God that it demands is incompatible with autonomy. That objection is 
usually presented as downstream from, and independent of, either of these other challenges. 
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of these commitments, we should instead reject the purported ideal of 
autonomy that would tell against them.34 If what I’ve said in this section is 
right, then love can provide the basis on which we do so, the middle way 
between dogmatism and hyper-rationalism that we seek.
IV. Why Kant(ians) Can’t Find the Middle Path
The examples of normatively significant, autonomously affirmed attitudes 
for which we have reasons, but to which we cannot reason indicate that 
dogmatism and hyper-rationalism are not exhaustive alternatives. But in 
the Groundwork Kant treats them as if they were. In the passage quoted 
in section I, he holds that the only alternative to autonomy is thinking of 
ourselves “only as subject to a law,” dogmatically accepting its authority. 
In this section, I explain how Kant’s argument for the unique status and 
authority of the CI depends on regarding this dichotomy as exhaustive.
Kant interprets any agent who does not act from the CI as acting from 
inclination. Moreover, in the Groundwork he thinks of inclinations on an 
empiricist model of desire, as mere psychological pressures or forces. 
The argument recognizes only two kinds of motives: the moral motive, to 
which we can reason, and inclinations for which we can have no reason. 
The former meets the hyper-rationalist standard. But the latter can be 
granted authority only dogmatically; like a literal push, inclination so 
construed has no intelligible content of the sort that could be either ques-
tioned or justified. So Kant construes an agent who acts from inclination as 
treating the fact that she has such a motive as her reason for acting. He is right 
to think that this attitude cannot be justified, and so could be affirmed only 
dogmatically. But he is wrong about the range of agents who can plausibly 
be so interpreted. In particular, it is implausible to assimilate agents who 
act from love, including love of God, to this model.
All of this requires more explanation, but let’s start with an example. 
As Christmas approaches, Calvin is doing his very best to act as if he were 
good. Among other things, he tries to follow the rule, Do not throw snow-
balls at Susie. His motive for following the rule is what Kant would call 
an inclination or material incentive. Such incentives direct one towards 
the production of some outcome. In this case, Calvin wants to get more 
Christmas loot, more gifts under the tree. He believes that acting as if he is 
good is a means to this end, and he believes that acting this way includes 
not throwing snowballs at Susie. So he adopts the no-snowballs principle 
as his rule.
Calvin meets the weakest standard of autonomy: he acts on a principle 
that he accepts as authoritative. But I think that most will agree that, even 
if he manages to refrain from snowball throwing, he does not thereby act 
from a moral principle. He may be acting in accord with duty, but he is 
not acting from duty. Since Calvin’s principle is not the unique principle 
of autonomy, the CI, Kant would regard Calvin as heteronomous in the 
34Cf. Ebels-Duggan, “Christian Philosophy and the Christian Life.”
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sense that most interests him. He has to think of Calvin’s fundamental 
principle of action as a principle of heteronomy.
Let’s think about what this fundamental principle is. Suppose we put 
the question of justification to Calvin. We ask him why he thinks he is 
required not to throw snowballs at Susie. He does have a sort of reason for 
refraining from snowball throwing, namely, that it is conducive to, even 
required for, securing one of his ends, acquiring the loot. This end, in turn, 
is given by his desire. Kant would have him say that he refrains from 
snowball throwing as a means to get what he most wants, or to produce 
the outcome towards which he is inclined. As Calvin thinks of it, the im-
perative not to throw snowballs at Susie binds him only because, and so 
long as, he continues to want to acquire the loot, and indeed to want this 
more than any competing alternative. If he were to decide that the loot 
was worth sacrificing for the delight of hitting Susie with a snowball, then 
he would not act irrationally when he hurled the snowball, at least not as 
far as this principle is concerned. So Calvin treats the fact that he wants a 
thing as the fundamental reason to pursue it. In later work, Kant calls the 
fundamental principle of the agent so motivated the principle of self-love.35
Contrast this interpretation of Calvin’s reasons for acting with our 
standard thinking about epistemic reasons. We often cite some belief 
as a reason for doing or believing some further thing. But we are rarely 
tempted to think that the reason cited is conditioned on the fact that we have 
the belief. Except in odd cases, it is the content of the belief, the presumed 
truth of what is believed, rather than the fact that I believe it, that I take to 
provide reasons. Standardly, if these reasons hold, they do so whether or 
not I have the belief, though without the belief I would lack access to them 
such that they could not figure in my thinking.
The interpretation of Calvin on offer is quite different. In reducing his 
motive just to the principle of self-love, the Kantian view under consider-
ation has him regarding the fact that he wants something, without regard 
to the content of what is wanted, as sufficient to create reasons for him to 
act. It construes him as taking that fact as both given and fixed. There is 
no space here for him to consider whether he has reason to want what he 
wants, whether it is a thing worth wanting, because on this view wants—
inclinations or material incentives—aren’t a kind of attitude for which we 
can have reasons. They are just psychological pressures, not the sort of 
thing about which a person could deliberate, but merely part of the back-
ground against which he acts.
Once we accept this way of thinking about desires, and regard Calvin 
as acting from self-love in Kant’s sense, it’s not hard to see why he would 
count as dogmatic. For we can raise a meaningful justificatory question 
about the principle of self-love: Why regard the fact that one wants some-
thing—where this just means that one experiences some psychological 
pressure towards it—as a reason to do it? By hypothesis, Calvin has no 
35Kant, Religion, 6:36.
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answer for this question. Kant thinks that there is no satisfactory answer 
to be given. Calvin is thus dogmatic about the authority of the desires 
that occur in him in just the way that the caricatured theist is imagined as 
dogmatic about acting on the commands of God.
This is a plausible reading of Calvin. As the paradigmatic six-year-old, 
Calvin is impulsive. He just goes for whatever he wants, and so he’s rea-
sonably regarded as taking his desires—just as such—as authoritative 
directives. But Kant’s argument for the CI’s unique status as a principle 
of autonomy depends on generalizing this analysis of Calvin’s practical 
thought and action to any agent who regards something other than the CI 
as her fundamental principle. All other agents, he claims, also treat the fact 
that they want a thing as giving them sufficient reason for action, and so act 
from the principle of self-love. So, like Calvin, they dogmatically affirm 
the principle of self-love that assigns their desires ultimate authority.
One can construct a theistic approach to ethics that mirrors Calvin’s 
approach to Christmas in just this way. Someone might regard his reasons 
to obey God as instrumental and so act from a theistic principle in order 
to receive a divine reward or to avoid divine punishment.36 This is per-
haps the most common version of theistic ethics invoked by philosophers, 
though usually just in passing. And it is plausible to think of that person 
as acting, ultimately, from the principle of self-love, just going for what he 
wants for the reason that he wants it.37 An agent who acts to please God 
just for the reason that he likes doing that, and—at the limit—an agent 
who just wants to stand in the relation of obedience to God could, likewise, 
be construed as acting from self-love. All of these agents find themselves 
inclined towards some outcome, and they believe that following God’s 
commands is a means to producing it. If they are correctly understood 
as taking the mere fact that they are so inclined as their reason, then they 
are not importantly different from someone motivated by honor, pleasure, 
money, or whatever else. All of these agents simply yield to the psycho-
logical pressure of their desires.
But the examples laid out in section III indicate that this is not the only, 
nor even the most plausible, way to construe agents who act from desires 
to which they neither do nor can reason. The person who acts from love of 
God would normally understand her own reasons quite differently. It may 
be true of her that she wants to please God or act for God’s sake, but she 
36Cf. Critique of Practical Reason, 5:41. Kant claims there that God’s will could be the 
ground of our action in only two ways. First, by appeal to “an antecedent practical principle 
independent of this idea.” Here, I take him to refer to the regress on rational conditions that 
I describe in section I: Obey God may be an authoritative practical principle, but its authority 
derives from a more fundamental one. The second, and only remaining, possibility is that the 
will of God grounds our actions “only by means of the happiness we expect” from adhering 
to it. This is the assimilation of the agent who embraces a theistic principle to the model that 
describes Calvin’s attitude towards Christmas. So, in this passage Kant affirms his dualism 
about fundamental motives, and he executes the strategy of assimilating all motives other 
than the distinctively moral motive of the CI to acting from the principle of self-love. 
37This seems to be how Kant imagines the sympathetic helper in Groundwork 4:398.
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need not take the reasons that she has to do these things as conditioned 
on her having these desires. Agents who understand themselves as acting 
out of love for God are more likely to think that the reasons to which they 
respond would hold even if their desires were different. They regard their 
desire—their love for God—as providing them with access to or insight 
into reasons that exist independently of it, just as beliefs standardly pro-
vide access to epistemic reasons. Since they cannot reason to this love, 
they do not meet the hyper-rationalist standard. But, like the lover of 
Shakespeare or of another human being, the love may nevertheless pro-
vide insight into the values and reasons to which their action responds.
Kant’s failure to entertain this possibility depends on thinking that only 
motives to which we can reason could provide such insight. And that, in 
turn, depends on construing any desire as just another arational inclina-
tion, a psychological force, not the sort of thing that could be responsive 
to reasons. If inclinations—and desires, and loves—were nothing but psy-
chological forces, then their content could not be the source of our reasons 
in the way that the content of a belief can be reason to believe something 
further. In fact, they would not have such content at all. An agent who 
treats an inclination as reason-giving could then only be regarding the fact 
that he has a desire as his reason. It is because he is thinking of any motive 
to which we do not reason in these terms that Kant can conclude that 
their purported authority is in every case captured by a dogmatic, and 
so heteronomous, principle of self-love. It is on the basis of this argument 
that Kant dismisses in one fell swoop all alternatives to the CI. Theistic 
principles are caught up among the casualties.
But a better view of desire—or of attitudes to which we do not reason 
more generally—would not force us to choose between dogmatism and 
hyper-rationalism. The middle path that I am trying to stake out would 
be more satisfying if paired with a more complete positive account of the 
conception of love or desire than I’ve given so far. The sense in which 
someone who loves can “have reasons” for her love and the actions that 
she takes from it needs to sit between two alternatives. On the one hand, as 
I have been concerned to stress, the reasons to which love gives us access 
are not standardly reasons that the agent they govern should be capable 
of articulating or reporting. Taken to its limit, a requirement for full artic-
ulacy about our reasons just is hyper-rationalism. It is the demand that 
we keep giving reasons until we cite something that it is not intelligible 
to question further. That standard is too strong. But on the other hand, 
having reasons in this way must go beyond the bare idea that there are 
reasons, that the commitments that we have are good ones. That standard 
is too weak. Reasons of this latter kind can attend a merely dogmatic com-
mitment, such as the affirmation of Shakespeare’s greatness based solely 
on a teacher’s report. We need an account of love and desire that makes 
it the case that in loving, it is we ourselves who are responsive to reasons, 
that we are active in determining what we love, but not by reasoning to it.
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In texts beyond the Groundwork, Kant begins to develop more nuanced 
and compelling views of desire along these lines, and some of his contem-
porary inheritors are carrying this project forward.38 These are welcome 
developments, but they will require other revisions in a Kantian view. 
Most importantly, if we adopt a view of desire as an attitude that can be 
had for reasons and reveal reasons to act, it becomes unclear why acting 
from desire should be regarded as heteronomous. But it does seem that a 
wide middle ground lies between hyper-rationalist and dogmatic motives. 
Love of other persons is in this middle ground, and in principle love of 
God can be found there too. There need be nothing dogmatic or distinc-
tively heteronomous about action from love so conceived. And if love itself 
can be an expression of our autonomy, then a theistic ethic based on love of 
God could be autonomous in any sense that should matter.39
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